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Introduction
The correspondence collected here represents an effort to start a conversation. Pending
legislation in the United Kingdom, based on what is known as the Clementi Report, would
permit non-lawyer equity investment in law firms, subject to regulatory oversight. See
http://www.dca.gov.uk/legist/legalservices.htm. In other words, UK law firms could become
publicly-traded businesses. This legislation has been proposed as part of reforms heralded as
improving the delivery of legal services to consumers. By contrast, such investment in law firms
is forbidden by ethical rules in the United States. What will happen when the two countries
with the most dominant global law firms begin to move along such different paths?
Australia already allows such investment, but the prospect of major UK firms raising
capital in the equity markets has the potential to produce seismic shifts in the global market for
legal services. It also could have far-reaching implications for the legal profession that we can
only dimly anticipate. Until now, there has been remarkably little discussion – especially in the
United States -- about the possible effects of the UK legislation.
This paper attempts to redress that situation. It consists of an exchange among Bruce
MacEwen, an expert on law firm economics and editor of the on-line publication Adam Smith,
Esq.; Mitt Regan, a Professor at Georgetown University Law Center, an expert on the legal
profession; and Larry Ribstein, a Professor at the University of Illinois College of Law, an expert
on partnership law. Mr. MacEwen can be contacted at bruce@adamsmithesq.com, and at the
Adam Smith website at www.AdamSmithEsq.com/blog. Professor Ribstein can be contacted at
ribstein@law.uiuc.edu, and at his website http://ideoblog.org/.
Appreciation of how profoundly the legal profession has changed in the past generation
is useful as background. Law firms in particular have felt the brunt of a transformation in which
they now must compete more fiercely than ever both for clients and for lawyers. As a result,
firms increasingly have taken on the characteristics of more conventional business enterprises.
They pay close attention to the financial performance of both the firm and its individual lawyers.
Information about a firm’s financial condition is now widely available and can prompt dramatic
reorganizations, including layoffs and reductions in compensation for lawyers.
Firms have grown substantially, with many containing over a thousand lawyers. They
have opened multiple offices in the United States and abroad. Most large firms employ a cadre
of non-lawyer professionals in executive and managerial positions, and vigorously market their
services. An increasing number now employ general counsel to represent the firm in various
matters. Most firms now are limited liability entities, and some have adopted the corporate
form. In these and other respects, law firms have come more closely to resemble their
corporate clients.
Some lament these changes as marking the loss of professional identity, while others
applaud them as overdue measures that overturn a guild system and make the provision of
legal services more efficient and responsive to clients. Until recently, however, there has been
one feature of business enterprise that has been strictly off-limits for law firms: equity
ownership by non-lawyers. While corporations are able to raise capital by selling shares to the
public, ethics rules have forbidden lawyers from practicing in any organization in which a non-
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lawyer holds an ownership interest. The rationale for this has been that such ownership risks
lay interference with lawyers’ professional judgment.
The discussion contained in the following pages begins with an inquiry by Bruce
MacEwen into whether current United States ethical rules would permit law firms to issue a
financial instrument whose value is tied to the financial performance of the firm. The rule
potentially most directly applicable is American Bar Association Model Rule 5.4, which provides
that a lawyer “shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association
authorized to practice law for a profit if . . . a nonlawyer owns any interest therein.” Mr.
MacEwen poses several questions. Could the financial instrument he describes be issued to
lawyers in a firm? To non-lawyers? Could it be sold to persons outside the firm and be publicly
traded? Would it represent an interest in the firm – thus forbidden by Rule 5.4 – or an interest
only in a derivative issued by the firm?
The discussion continues with a response from Mitt Regan. Professor Regan analyzes
the application of Rule 5.4 to a financial instrument with various characteristics. He then moves
to a discussion of the underlying concerns of that Rule, the changes in law firms that might
occur as a result of issuing a publicly traded derivative, and the extent to which these changes
might implicate the values that animate Rule 5.4. He suggests that the ability to sell such a
derivative could produce some salutary changes in law firms. He also asks, however, whether
the prospect that lawyers would “practice to the share price” could have an undesirable effect
on lawyers’ roles as client representatives and as stewards of the legal system.
Professor Larry Ribstein then joins the conversation by offering short comments that
serve as a prelude to his later correspondence. He acknowledges the concerns that Professor
Regan raises, but questions whether regulating the structure of law firms, rather than their
behavior, is the best way to address them. Furthermore, he suggests, the dynamics of the
market may serve as an additional influence that leads lawyers to attend to their
responsibilities.
Mr. MacEwen replies to Professor Regan, and briefly to Professor Ribstein, by suggesting
that the experience of other professional service firms—such as in the financial services industry
-- indicates that public ownership can create incentives for both innovation and efficiency in the
provision of services. In particular, firms would have reason to invest more in organizational
capital that would contribute to stable long-term financial performance. Far from representing
the abandonment of professionalism, he maintains, the adoption of this strategy could provide
the financial foundation necessary for the realization of professional values.
Professor Ribstein then extends the discussion by focusing in more detail on the
prospect of publicly-owned law firms. He analyzes the possible impact on lawyers’ ability to
satisfy their obligations both to clients and to sustaining legal institutions. He concludes that
firms with outside investors could meet both these obligations while operating more efficiently.
In particular, equity ownership could enhance incentives for lawyers to behave in ways that
promote the collective interests of the firm, rather than their own separate individual interests.
To the extent that we are concerned that lawyers may not be sufficiently attentive to their role
of preserving the social capital represented by the legal system, we should regulate lawyer
behavior rather than law firm structure. At a minimum, he suggests, firms should be free to
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choose among various organizational structures that states might want to make available, free
of impediments imposed by uniform state professional rules.
Mr. MacEwen concludes the exchange by suggesting that eliminating restrictions on law
firm structure could unleash Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” in the market for legal
services. This could give rise in particular to multi-disciplinary firms that offer a range of both
legal and non-legal services. Ultimately, he questions whether the ethical rules that prevent
such a development serve the purposes that are invoked on their behalf.
The ideas expressed in this exchange are not the final word on the subject. Indeed,
they are meant to be exactly the opposite: an initial foray into new territory whose features
can’t all be foreseen. Ready or not, lawyers and the public are facing developments that raise
profound questions about the identity and commitments of the profession. Navigating these
developments will require an open mind, deep reflection, and the capacity to imagine
alternative worlds. We invite you to buckle up and begin the journey.
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Adam Smith, Esq.
305 West 98th Street
(#4C-S)
New York, NY 10025
March 26, 2007

Prof. Milton Regan
Georgetown University Law Center
600 New Jersey Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20001-2075

Via email: regan@law.georgetown.edu

Re: Law Firms & Capital Markets Access
Dear Mitt:
I’d like to solicit your thoughts on a concept I’ve been turning over in my mind for some
time, and I’d actually like to enlist your help in the project, to the extent you’re interested,
going forward.
Here’s the problem: While lawyers can and certainly do earn very handsome incomes
as senior partners in AmLaw 100 firms, they have no material wealth-creation opportunities.
No stock options, no routine opportunity to invest in deals (setting aside the brief dot-com
bubble when firms, if not individual lawyers, took equity in startups in lieu of cash fees, an
experience whose end-game means it will probably not be readily embraced again soon), no
supranormal income windfalls such as investment bankers experience with bonuses, which can
be invested long-term for meaningful wealth creation.
This state of affairs leaves law firms at a competitive disadvantage when it comes to
recruiting and retaining talent.
•
•
•
•

Associates can be lured by investment banks, management consulting, and even plain
old corporate clients with stock options on attractive growth trajectories.
Partners as well can be lured to private equity or hedge funds, or in-house to quality law
departments (GE’s being the poster child), again with stock options on the table.
“C-suite” executives in law firms cannot be compensated at levels equivalent to their
peers at similarly-sized corporations.
Last and most obvious, ordinary income receives the most onerous tax treatment of all
forms of potential compensation.

On a more personal level, I’ve spoken with several managing partners of major firms
who have seen their firms’ gross annual revenues double, quadruple, or more during their
tenures, and who are understandably exasperated that they have no way of personally
benefiting from what would be the handsome performance of the law firm’s “stock” in a way
that any corporate CEO would as a matter of routine. Adding insult to injury, these people also
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have to keep very substantial amounts of personal capital locked up inside the firm, often
earning sub-market or even zero interest.
My thoughts have also been informed by speculation on what the coming Clementi
reforms might mean in the UK.
So this is the key question on which I seek your input, both as a corporate lawyer and a
legal ethics luminary:

Could law firms, consonant with ethical rules, create a derivative financial instrument,
tradable as if it were a stock, engineered to reflect the implicit value of the firm?
And, could this financial instrument be sold to and bought by:
•
•
•

Lawyers within the firm (whether or not partners);
C-suite executives and other non-lawyers at the firm;
Outside investors, presumably “accredited,” such as private equity funds?

I don’t want to go into the financial engineering behind designing such a derivative,
other than to say there are people who spend their lives creating just such creatures: Let’s
assume for the nonce that it could be suitably crafted.
My real question for you is how this would fit within current ethical rules. I assume the
pertinent part of the ABA’s Model Rules is §5.4, and specifically:
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the
partnership consist of the practice of law.
(c) […]
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or
association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the
estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time
during administration;
(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof or occupies the position of
similar responsibility in any form of association other than a corporation ; or
(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.
I don’t know the interpretive rulings, if any, under this proviso, and I certainly am not in
a position to predict how the ABA or other regulatory authorities might react if the concept I
have in mind were launched, but on the face of it I don’t see how my proposal violates §5.4:
•
•

5.4(b) is not remotely what I’m proposing
5.4(d)(1) is a closer call, but I still think that what I’m proposing would give the nonlawyer an ownership interest in a derivative security, not the firm itself
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•

5.4(d)(2) & (3) are also beside the point of what I’m proposing: The nonlawyers would
be passive owners of the security, akin to limited partners (or garden variety public
company shareholders) with no colorable voice in management.

Aside from trying to interpret the literal language of §5.4 to permit us to get where we
want to go, I honestly believe the more fundamental principle that §5.4 is attempting to
uphold—that lawyers’ professional judgment should not be compromised by pressures to serve
the financial interests of others—is not impaired in the slightest by my proposal. You know as
well as I that the fastest way to drive clients away from a firm is for its lawyers to be visibly
serving interests other than their client’s, and I don’t personally know a single professional who
would countenance that, as a matter of personal and professional integrity.
So: What are your thoughts? If other people have tried to plow this field before me
without success, I’m unaware of it. Sometimes it’s only by questioning very bedrock
assumptions that one gets anywhere.
I look forward to discussing this.
Best regards,

Bruce MacEwen

PS: The proposed Blackrock IPO has a fascinating structure that might provide
guidance on how this hypothetical security could be constructed. As you may know, Blackstone
itself is the general partner in various investment funds, but that general partner is itself a
limited partnership, and it’s the limited partnership that is going public—as a partnership, not a
corporation, thus avoiding (among other things) the NYSE’s listing requirement that
corporations have a majority of independent directors.
I’m not proposing that law firms go public—let them experiment with that in the UK first
and we’ll learn how to avoid train wrecks over here—but the point is creative deal engineering
can be done.
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Georgetown University Law Center
600 New Jersey Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
March 31, 2007
Dear Bruce:
Thanks for sharing your idea about the possibility of law firms creating a derivative
instrument structured to reflect the implicit value of the firm. The idea not only raises a
question about the application of ABA Model Rule 5.4, but also necessarily prompts
reexamination of broader assumptions about the modern large law firm, the nature of
professional obligations, and the complex interaction between lawyer regulation and the legal
services market. In what follows, I’ll begin with an analysis of Rule 5.4, but that analysis
quickly will lead to a discussion of these larger issues.
You ask: “Could law firms, consonant with ethical rules, create a derivative financial
instrument engineered to reflect the implicit value of the firm as if it were tradable as a stock?”
Could a firm sell this derivative to: (1) lawyers within the firm, both partners and non-partners;
(2) high-level executives and other non-lawyers in the firm; and (3) outside investors, perhaps
“accredited,” such as private equity funds. I’ll focus first on two groups at the end of the
spectrum – lawyers in the firm and outside investors – because I’m most confident about the
likely interpretation of Rule 5.4 as applied to them, and because the likely contrast in the
treatment of these groups will highlight the underlying conceptual issues. I’ll then conclude
with a short discussion of the application of the rule to non-lawyer executives and employees.

Sale of Derivative to Lawyers in the Firm
The easiest issue is the availability of a derivative to lawyers within the firm. This would
neither violate Rule 5.4(a)’s prohibition on sharing legal fees with nonlawyers, nor Rule 5.4(d)’s
proscription on lawyers practicing in an organization that practices law if a “nonlawyer owns any
interest therein.” More generally, it would not implicate the concern that is the rationale for the
Rule. That concern is that a lawyer’s professional judgment may be influenced by non-lawyers
with a financial stake in the lawyer’s representation of a client. Such parties are not subject to
the ethical obligations with which lawyers must comply, and ostensibly may attempt to place
pressure on a lawyer to maximize financial return at the expense of compliance with the
lawyer’s professional duties.
The type of financial instrument you describe would seem comparable to existing
compensation schemes that are based on the financial performance both of the firm and of
individual lawyers. It’s beyond my capacity to engage in complex valuation analysis, but I
assume that the derivative would differ from the existing partnership draw system in that it
would incorporate capitalized future earnings rather than simply annual revenue. As such, it
would reflect an assessment of the likely contribution of the firm’s organizational capital –
systems, procedures, various forms of support and coordination – to the firm’s profitability in
the foreseeable term. In this respect, the revenue potential of the firm would be more than
simply the sum of the earnings of the individual lawyers in the firm.
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In any event, the important point is that the derivative would not inject the specter of
non-lawyer influence on lawyers’ professional judgment, and would be similar to current
compensation approaches that are designed to create incentives for individual lawyers to
maximize financial performance. Indeed, there is an argument that this type of financial
instrument might align the individual lawyer’s incentives more closely with the success of the
firm as a whole, and perhaps somewhat less with simply the individual’s profitability. More on
that in a bit.

Sale of Derivative to Outside Investors
Let’s move now to the application of Rule 5.4 to outside investors. The most pertinent
portion of the Rule is likely 5.4(d)(1), which says that a lawyer may not practice in any
organization that practices law if “a nonlawyer owns any interest therein[.]” One can argue
that this provision does not apply, because the owner of a derivative would own not an interest
in the firm, but in a security that has been issued by the firm. Furthermore, the argument
would go, simply holding a derivative as a passive investor would not create the risk of
nonlawyer interference with lawyers’ judgment that animates the prohibition on fee-sharing in
Rule 5.4(a), or on nonlawyers assuming positions of influence in a law practice under Rule
5.4(d)(2) and (3).
This is a plausible interpretation, but I suspect that a state bar is unlikely to accept it.
My guess is that a bar would maintain that Rule 5.4(d)(1) is intended to prohibit any nonlawyer
from acquiring a financial interest whose value is dependent on law firm financial performance.
A derivative instrument, the argument would go, by definition represents such an interest.
One response to this might be that the underlying concern of Rule 5.4(d)(1) is the
exercise of investor influence on lawyer judgment. Those who would hold derivative
instruments, however, would be passive investors, with no voice in the operation of the firm.
Indeed, getting a bit ahead of myself, law firms could issue publicly-traded shares with no
voting rights, which arguably also would not raise the concern that animates the Rule. This
suggests, perhaps ironically to some, that a publicly-traded law firm would be less problematic
than one owned by private equity, since equity funds tend to want an active role in exerting
influence over the companies in which they invest.
I suspect, however, that a state bar would not accept this argument. Analyzing why not
requires that we address a more fundamental issue: what, if anything, is problematic about
passive nonlawyer investment in a law firm?
If the holder of the financial instrument can exert no meaningful direct influence over
how the firm is run, why should we prevent firms from gaining access to this source of capital?
The response is likely to be that we don’t want lawyers “practicing to the share price” – i.e.,
making decisions in their representation that are driven mainly by a desire to maintain the value
of the derivative. As we’ve seen in the corporate sector, shareholders typically have little actual
influence over managerial decisions, but many claim that managers have become obsessed with
share price to the detriment of the corporation. The risk is that this public metric or scorecard
itself, not those who hold the instrument, may distort judgment.
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Agency Costs
What are the specific risks to which a critic of outside investment might point? One,
which has tended to generate the most discussion, is that lawyers’ financial self-interest in
keeping share price (or its equivalent) high will tempt them to place their own welfare above
that of their clients when the two collide. This would violate the lawyer’s duty as a fiduciary to
subordinate her interests to those of the client. This argument is based on the familiar concern
about agency costs – what is the likelihood that any given variable will increase the probability
that an agent will be faithless to her principal?
One question is whether the presence of passive investors would increase this risk
beyond what already exists because of the financial performance pressures that law firms
currently face. This is a crucial issue, which I’ll defer for the moment and discuss at length
below. Perhaps the most common rejoinder to the agency costs argument, however, is that
lawyers who placed their own interests above those of their clients would soon be penalized by
a competitive legal services market. Firms that acquired a reputation for such self-serving
behavior would soon find their revenues fall and the value of their derivative drop accordingly.
Breaching their fiduciary duty, in other words, would be a self-destructive move. Indeed, the
argument goes, the desire to keep the derivative value high would lead firms to exert even
more effort on behalf of firms because keeping the customers happy is the true path to financial
success.
I will ignore the more complicated reality that this straightforward theory elides, and
what I take to be mixed experience with other types of professional service firms who have
raised capital by going to the equity markets. Laura Empson’s research sheds some light on
this experience. The argument that the market will limit agency costs certainly has some force,
but even if we accept it without reservation there is a second concern that is distinctive to the
legal profession.
Law as a Public Good
This is that lawyers produce a distinctive kind of product: law. It is by now a
commonplace observation that lawyers help make “law” in their work at least as much as
legislatures and courts do. As the legal realists forcefully reminded us, the latter promulgate
the “law on the books,” but lawyers shape the “law in action.” This is perhaps most obvious in
litigation, where the arguments that lawyers advance often become precedent that regulates
other parties in the future. It’s also true in work such as regulatory counseling, when lawyers
offer advice on how far to push the envelope that may formally or informally create the
boundaries within which legitimate activity can occur, and transactional work, where lawyers
devise novel legal forms that can become part of the accepted repertoire of private
arrangements that the law will honor. Each representation, even if only incrementally, thus
produces externalities; every lawyer simultaneously is engaged in production of both private
and public goods.
Of course, we have come to appreciate that most major economic organizations in
modern society affect a variety of stakeholders. Corporate managers increasingly are asked by
the social responsibility movement to internalize more of the externalities that they generate.
Shareholders are but one of the constituencies whose interests they must balance. The point,
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however, is that the externalities that lawyers produce affect the very basis of social order in a
democracy. The rule of law constitutes the understandings that people have about the scope
and limits of proper behavior and, even more broadly, the willingness to abide by those limits
rather than pursue unconstrained self-interest. As the experience of developing countries and
many Eastern European countries reflects, this is a form of social capital that is critical to belief
in the basic legitimacy of the social order. It’s not something that can be imposed from the top;
it emerges instead from everyday experiences that affect perceptions of the extent to which the
legal system embodies justice. One of the concerns with abusive tax shelters, for instance, is
that their proliferation may decrease the perceived legitimacy of the tax system, a serious
problem for a system that relies mostly on voluntary compliance in order to function.
The role of the lawyer in producing this public good is captured metaphorically (and
literally in the litigation context) by the idea that a lawyer not only is a private agent but an
“officer of the court” – someone who has at least some obligation to preserve the viability of
the legal system itself. The bar commonly invokes this role in debates over privilege and
confidentiality in the corporate setting. If communications between lawyers and their corporate
clients are not assiduously protected from disclosure, the bar argues, lawyers will be less
effective in ensuring that corporations act legally and responsibly. Clients will be less likely to
include lawyers in the information loop if they fear that what they tell them will become public,
and those conversations that do occur will be less candid. Regardless of the accuracy of this
claim, the point is that it’s premised on the notion that the lawyer is not simply an agent
obligated to carry out the client’s wishes, but is someone who acts as an informal regulator of
the client’s conduct. The post-Enron SEC rules governing securities lawyers and the revision of
ABA Model Rule 1.13 also reflect the notion that the lawyer has at least some gatekeeping
responsibility with respect to client conduct.
One concern about “practicing to the share price” therefore is that lawyers may identify
too closely with client interests and will be less willing to place limits on their pursuit. That is,
the problem may be precisely that the market will be too effective in aligning lawyers with
clients, since that’s the path to profitability and a high share price. Playing the role of steward
of the legal system may not be financially rewarding, and may in fact be financially
counterproductive, in a competitive market for legal services. Lawyers may have little incentive
to attend to the quality of the public good that they produce in every representation; after all,
no one will be compensating them on behalf of society as a whole.
Appreciating this dimension of the lawyer’s work doesn’t automatically mean that we
should reject the idea of the type of derivative instrument that you describe, or even publicly
traded law firm shares. It simply puts another consideration on the table that we need to take
into account. The question then becomes: what would be the impact of such reforms on
lawyers’ ability and willingness both to place clients’ interests above financial self-interest, and
to ensure that client conduct does not undermine the social capital embodied in the legal
system? Expressed even more pointedly: would the existence of a share price, either shadow
or actual, have any effects significantly different from the financial incentives that lawyers and
law firms already face? If not, there’s an argument that making available a new source of
capital in the form of outside investors would be beneficial on balance.
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The Potential Significance of Derivative/Share Price
The financial pressures that law firms currently face are well known. The legal services
market has become intensely competitive over the past generation, and the landscape is littered
with the shells of firms that have not been able to survive the transition. Revenue and profit
information is readily available, and various ratios based on financial performance are used to
rank firms. Profits per equity partner (PEP) and Revenue per Lawyer (RPL), rightly or wrongly
seem to be the two metrics that receive the most attention and most often affect behavior (as,
of course, in Mayer Brown’s recent decision to de-equitize 10% of its equity partners). One
might argue that in this environment lawyers and law firms already may be prone to pursue
their own financial self-interest at the expense of clients, or to acquiesce in client wishes
regardless of their questionable legality. Would the risks be any greater if there were outside
investment in law firms? Assuming such investment were passive, would a share price per se
have any different effect than PEP?
I think this question is surprisingly hard to answer with any clear confidence. Consider
first the impact on law firm structure and culture. What law firm characteristics are likely to be
attractive to investors? Well, stability for one. The assets of law firms are mobile individuals.
As Stephen Mayson suggests, “if the firm is perceived to be dependent on key partners who
could leave the firm, taking relationships and client work with them, the sustainability of the
firm’s income could be doubted and its value depressed.” Stephen Mayson, Building
Sustainable Value: A Capital Idea, in MANAGING THE MODERN LAW FIRM: NEW CHALLENGES,
NEW PERSPECTIVES 141, 146 (Laura Empson ed. 2007).
Firms with high share prices would not be simply those with major rainmakers. Rather,
they would be those that were most successful in integrating lawyers into the firm, coordinating
their practices, and efficiently using both legal and non-legal staff to provide services. This
premium on organizational integration could reduce the power of rainmakers and lessen activity
in the lateral market. Currently, there is no influential stakeholder whose financial stake in the
firm encourages profitable lawyers to curb self-interest for the sake of the firm. Those with the
most business are the most mobile, and often the least inclined to make this compromise. As a
result, firms are vulnerable to becoming temporary coalitions whose stability can be threatened
when departures reach a tipping point. It’s possible that if derivative/share value becomes a
critical metric, rainmakers may conclude that harmonizing their practices with the firm will be
more profitable than seeking the best compensation package in the free agent market.
Indeed, perhaps to become even more fanciful, firms may decide that a compensation
system weighted heavily toward “eat what you kill” is counterproductive in a world in which
stability and commitment to the firm are key considerations for investors. This may lead to a
more productive balance of cooperative and competitive incentives within the firm, as well as
simply a more pleasant and supportive atmosphere. Less emphasis on individual lawyers as
profit centers could reduce the opportunity costs of providing training and mentoring, and
induce firms to invest more heavily in such activities to enhance the productivity of the overall
organization. It may reduce inclinations to hoard work, and encourage more cross-selling and
referrals within the firm. Investor preference for stability thus could temper what some see as
excessively individualistic tendencies in modern law practice.
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At the same time, the ultimate source of profits in a law firm, as in any professional
services organization, would continue to be human capital. Lawyers who use it to attract clients
will still be essential to a firm’s financial success, and are likely to have substantial, even if
somewhat reduced, influence. Furthermore, if share price become the metric by which to
evaluate law firms, lawyers will have an unequivocal standard to use in deciding whether to
stay at or leave a firm. Even if firms as a whole might be better off if they refrained from
encouraging an active lateral market, any one firm may be unable to resist the temptation to
use its share price as a lure for partners at other firms.
Nonetheless, let’s assume for the purposes of discussion that lawyers will have an
incentive in an outside investor regime to place more importance on contributing to the
financial success of the firm as a whole. What would this mean for lawyers’ ability and
willingness to serve clients faithfully, and to ensure that client conduct didn’t erode the social
capital of the legal system? One current lament is that firms have only limited ability to
regulate the behavior of their lawyers, because they are keenly aware that rainmakers may
decamp for other firms if there is any effort to encroach on their freedom of action. Any effort
to impose anything more than minimal ground rules may precipitate this exodus. Firms
therefore may hesitate to rein in profitable lawyers who are pushing the envelope -- as may
have happened with Jenkens & Gilchrist and tax shelter partner Paul Daugerdas. From this
perspective, a less active lateral market would give firms leverage to enforce more robust
standards of conduct and foster a more unified firm culture. The lesser attraction of exit as an
option may compensate for firms’ inability in most states to enforce even reasonable penalties
on lawyers who leave the firm and take clients with them. On the difficulties for firms created
by the unenforceability of such penalties, see my Law Firms, Competition Penalties, and the
Values of Professionalism, 13 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1 (1999), and Larry Ribstein’s Ethical Rules,
Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1707, 1730-1738 (1998).
Some, perhaps many, lawyers, however, would regard this as an unwelcome movement
toward organizational interference with the judgment of individual lawyers. A powerful strain of
professionalism asserts that ethics and professional responsibility ultimately are matters of
individual judgment. As such, they depend on the ability of each lawyer to engage in
deliberation without being subject to any “outside” influences. Lawyers traditionally have been
fiercely jealous of their autonomy, and resistant to any policies or procedures that threaten to
reduce them to mere “employees” rather than independent professionals. For those who see
things from this perspective, the greater leverage that a firm might acquire over individual
behavior as a result of outside ownership would lessen the ability of lawyers to serve clients as
they see fit and to ensure the propriety of client conduct.
While we can’t dismiss the importance of individual character, this formulation of
professionalism is blind to the profound impact of organizational structures on individual
behavior. Countless studies establish that people act differently in organizations than they do
on their own, and that there are distinctive ethical risks that characterize the organizational
setting. In the bureaucratic world of the twenty-first century, ethical conduct is crucially
dependent on organizational structure and culture. Treating efforts to establish such structure
and culture automatically as intrusions on ethical autonomy badly misreads the modern ethical
landscape. An individual lawyer subject to a strict “eat what you kill” compensation system
arguably is at far more ethical risk than one who practices in a firm that requires lawyers to
comply with standard procedures in matters such as client intake, engagement letters, and the
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provision of legal opinions. I’ve suggested how such a compensation system may play at least
some role in contributing to ethical misconduct in my case study EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE
FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER (University of Michigan Press 2004).
Furthermore, as Gilson and Mnookin observed twenty years ago, a law firm represents
an opportunity for lawyers to share the risks of downturns in their respective practices. Ronald
Gilson & Robert Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry Into the
Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 313 (1985). Having some
degree of protection from the full brunt of market volatility can provide the space for an
individual lawyer to take account of non-financial considerations in the conduct of law practice.
Such an arrangement is only possible, however, if lawyers see themselves as participants in a
collective undertaking, rather than as contractors who use the firm solely as a platform for
obtaining rewards based on individual profitability.
Yes, it’s possible that a firm may use its increased influence to pressure lawyers to act
unethically. A firm that invests in organizational capital that makes it more financially and
culturally stable, however, seems less likely to do this than one facing financial pressures and
cultural discontinuity caused by significant vulnerability to the lateral market. Furthermore, for
a long time we have simplistically overemphasized the variable of personal character on ethical
behavior, and underestimated the influence of situational forces than can influence conduct.
Automatically equating greater organizational influence with an intrusion on ethical autonomy is
an expression of this myopia. Anything that redirects our traditional narrow focus in ethics from
the individual to the impact of organizational structures would be salutary.
Is there a risk, however, that the value of a derivative instrument or an equity share
would quickly become the uber-metric, the single number by which law firms are evaluated?
Many complain, of course, that this is exactly what has happened with publicly traded
corporations, and that managers’ tendency to “manage to the share price” has had pernicious
effects. Indeed, the “Paulson” working group on United States capital markets has recently
recommended that companies stop providing quarterly earnings estimates, in an effort to
reduce the influence of share prices on managerial decisions. Would the emergence of
derivative/share price as the key measure of law firm performance be any worse than the
current regime in which figures such as PEP and RPL have assumed such importance?
As Adam Smith, Esq. has highlighted, of course, Guy Beringer of Allen & Overy has
suggested that PEP has already become “the sole measure of success,” and that this
development is short-sighted. Beringer argues that “[a] proper measure of success will never
be simple and one-dimensional,” and that PEP “should be replaced with measures which take
account of sustainable profitability, client satisfaction and staff motivation.” Furthermore,
Beringer maintains, PEP pays no heed to corporate responsibility; I have suggested that the
impact of lawyers’ work on the legal system makes this an especially critical consideration in
evaluating lawyers and law firms. If we already are at the point where PEP has become the
dominant metric, however, would substituting derivative/share price in its stead make much of
a difference?
My tentative sense is that it might. Notwithstanding the decline of belief in the Efficient
Capital Market Hypothesis, share price has acquired almost mythical status as the virtually
unquestioned measure of corporate performance in the eyes of investors and the public.
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Furthermore, those who argue that the basic function of a company is shareholder wealth
maximization dominate modern thinking on the corporation. It is common, for instance, for
people to assume unproblematically that shareholders “own” the corporation, even though their
bundle of rights resembles nothing like conventional property ownership.
Even though PEP casts a large shadow, it is not without critics, and there are other
figures that can be used to complement or even challenge it. If law firms were to acquire
outside investors, however, they would enter a domain in which the powerful gravitational pull
is toward maximizing a single number by which firms are evaluated: share price. It would be
easy to think of investors as “owning” the firms in the same way that people tend to think of
shareholders as “owning” a corporation. If this occurs, there might be little space for firms to
rely on other measures of performance, and less latitude to engage in activities – such as pro
bono work – that did not contribute to the bottom line.
There’s also the possibility of a more nebulous symbolic, but no less significant,
consequence of outside investment in law firms. This is the public perception of lawyers and
the law. Yes, I’ve familiar with the lawyer jokes – some of them are quite funny – and I
recognize that the public has a certain amount of skepticism about the connection between the
legal system and justice. If law firms were to enter the equity markets, however, the
perception might be that a qualitatively important divide had been crossed. Lawyers might be
assimilated completely into the ranks of businessmen and women, and law regarded as even
more explicitly a commodity for sale. This puts it somewhat dramatically; the possibility is of
course speculative and would be difficult to prove empirically. Symbols matter, however, even
if they’re not amenable to precise measurement.
All this is rather a long way of saying that my suspicion is that, notwithstanding a
plausible interpretation of Rule 5.4(d)(1) that would permit issuing a derivative instrument, a
state bar is likely to interpret the Rule to prohibit it. I’ve suggested what I think would be the
main objections even to passive investment by outside investors. As I hope my analysis
indicates, the value of your proposal is that it would require considering some basic questions
regarding lawyers and law firms, and the answers to those questions are by no means selfevident.
I generally side with those who regard the profession-business dichotomy as
spectacularly unhelpful, and who argue that financial success is an important prerequisite for a
firm’s ability to pursue broader objectives. I’m also well aware of the traditional guild-like
resistance of the bar to any changes that might threaten its professional prerogatives. At the
same time, I don’t think that we can dismiss the rhetoric of professionalism, or what Laura
Empson calls the “professional ethos,” as wholly an expression of self-interest. As I’ve
suggested, despite their need to survive in a competitive legal services market, I don’t think
that law firms should be assimilated completely into the category of just another form of
business enterprise. That said, the impact of a derivative instrument, or even equity ownership,
on firms requires far closer analysis than the reflexive denunciation of money-changers in the
temple.
Finally, it’s worth noting that the ABA’s Kutak Commission, charged with drafting new
Model Rules to replace the Code of Professional Responsibility, originally proposed in 1981 that
Rule 5.4 permit lawyers to practice in firms in which non-lawyers held a financial interest. This
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would have been conditioned on written assurance that there would be “no interference with
the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship.”
The Comment to the proposed Rule observed, “In its classical form the law firm
consisted solely of lawyers, assisted by apprentices and scriveners. Over the course of time the
law firm has evolved into a variety of organizations.” The Comment continued, “All such
arrangements raise problems concerning the client-lawyer relationship. Given the complex
variety of modern legal services, it is impractical to define organizational forms that uniquely
can guarantee compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.” The proposed Rule was
rejected by the ABA membership, which substituted the current version of Rule 5.4. This
history suggests, however, that there is some historical precedent for the discussion we’re
having, and for the imminent reforms in the UK.

Sale of Derivative to Non-Lawyers Within the Firm
It may be a bit anticlimactic at this point, but one issue remains, which is whether Rule
5.4 would prohibit sale of a derivative to non-lawyer executives and employees of the firm. If
the underlying concern about passive investment under Rule 5.4(d)(1) is the prospect of
lawyers “practicing to the share price,” this concern arguably would be less salient with respect
at least to non-executive employees. The derivative would be less a way of tapping into a
major new source of capital, and more a means of making compensation more attractive for
those who contribute to the success of the firm.
The absence of a large trading market also would mean that the price of the derivative
might assume less visibility, and have less significance, than if the instrument were sold to
outside investors. For this reason, it might not have the kind of potential influence on law firm
decisions that’s likely to lead state bar organizations to prohibit selling the derivative to the
public at large. That’s not to say that a state bar wouldn’t treat the sale of a derivative to nonexecutive employees as a violation of the Rule, but there would at least be a decent argument
the other way. Furthermore, Rule 5.4(a)’s proscription on sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer
would not seem to be a problem. Even if we regard the derivative as the equivalent of sharing
such fees, section (a)(3) of the Rule permits profit-sharing in furtherance of a compensation or
retirement plan.
Sale of the instrument to non-lawyer executives, however, might be more of a problem.
There would be an argument that the executives are not passive investors, but occupy positions
of influence within the firm. The ostensible risk is that a non-lawyer might have an incentive to
exercise authority over lawyers that intrudes on their judgment for reasons of financial selfinterest. This risk would seem to depend on the nature of the position that the executive
occupies. A person who is the head of Information Technology or the Chief Financial Officer,
for instance, arguably isn’t in a position to exercise influence on lawyers’ professional decisions.
A non-lawyer Chief Operating Officer, however, may be, which may make him or her ineligible
for purchase of the derivative. It’s possible to characterize a COO’s authority as simply not
extending to any professional judgments that lawyers make, and therefore as posing no risk,
but the practical realities of influence within the firm may lead regulators to find that argument
unpersuasive.
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Conclusion
I’ve provided a pretty lengthy answer to a simple question. The reason is that your
proposal forces us to consider the implicit premises of longstanding assumptions. I’m certainly
haven’t resolved definitively all the issues that this raises, but you’ve made me think about just
what those issues are more clearly than I have before. That’s an impressive accomplishment
for a one-sentence question.
Thanks for sharing your idea with me. I’m of course happy (in fact eager) to talk about
all of this at greater length.
Best Wishes,
Mitt
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University of Illinois College of Law
504 East Pennsylvania Avenue
Champaign, Illinois 61820
April 1, 2007

Dear Bruce
This is, indeed, something I'm interested in. Unfortunately I haven't had the time to
think through anything like the elaborate answer that Mitt has come up with. I do have two
general thoughts.
First, while we can easily envision problems with any new organizational tool, the
fundamental question, it seems to me, is the extent to which law firms present unique
problems. For example, there are agency costs inherent in any capital structure, but for firms
generally we let the market, including the market for state law, work out those problems.
Should law firms be different? Of course lawyers and law firms are important to the legal
system and society. But we generally address firms' social costs by regulating their conduct
rather than their internal structure. Social responsibility theorists have urged the latter
response, but so far their arguments have been rejected. Is there a special reason for accepting
those arguments here?
Second, to the extent that your derivative idea might be said to cause special problems,
to what extent can we attribute this to the need for financial arbitrage? You've proposed
minimal interference with existing rules. Would we be better off -- for clients and society -- if
we just scrapped the rules and let the market equilibrate?
Again, I don't have answers, and I don't intend this as a criticism of Mitt's response,
which I haven't studied. I look forward to further discussions.
Larry
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Adam Smith, Esq.
305 West 98th Street
(#4C-S)
New York, NY 10025
April 5, 2007

Prof. Milton Regan
Georgetown University Law Center
600 New Jersey Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20001-2075

Via email: regan@law.georgetown.edu

Re: Law Firms & Capital Markets Access
Dear Mitt:
This is to lay out my further thoughts on this topic, as informed by and partially in
response to your comprehensive March 31 letter to me, which was deeply thoughtful and just
plain impressive: Thanks.
Concerning your letter, overall my reaction is one of fundamental agreement, albeit on
some points I believe I can offer a view either countervailing to yours or congruent, but
extending your thoughts to arrive at a slightly modified destination.
The Issue
To reiterate part of my earlier letter, here’s the situation that initially got me thinking
about this problem: While lawyers can and certainly do earn very handsome incomes as senior
partners in AmLaw 100 firms, they have no material wealth-creation opportunities akin to those
available to corporate executives, such as stock options.
This state of affairs leaves law firms at a competitive disadvantage when it comes to
recruiting and retaining talent. Lawyers can be lured by private equity, hedge funds,
investment banks, management consulting, and even plain old corporate clients offering stock
options. Also, “C-suite” executives in law firms cannot be compensated at levels equivalent to
their peers at similarly-sized corporations. Last and most obvious, ordinary income receives the
most onerous tax treatment of all forms of potential compensation.
On a more personal level, I’ve spoken with several managing partners of major firms
who have seen their firms’ gross annual revenues double, quadruple, or more during their
tenures, and who are understandably exasperated that they have no way of personally
benefiting from what would be the handsome performance of the law firm’s “stock” in a way
that any corporate CEO would as a matter of routine.
Adding insult to injury, these people also have to keep very substantial amounts of
personal capital locked up inside the firm, often earning below-market or even zero interest.
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My thoughts have also been informed by speculation over the past few years on what the
coming Clementi reforms might mean in the UK.
Analysis & Response
Here, I won’t re-state your thoughts in your March 31 letter, but I’ll try to respond to and
extend them where germane.

The Derivative Security Itself
Short-changed in my initial proposal was fleshing out what would lie behind valuation of
the derivative itself. It would reflect more than simply annual revenue or gross profits, and
would reflect or incorporate a component relating to ongoing enterprise value—not just income,
but an assessment of the firm’s organizational capital (systems, know-how, coordination skills)
and reputational capital (with clients, potential competitors, law schools and judges).
Also, I’d like to highlight a conceptual flaw lawyers are prone to in thinking about the financial
returns they receive from a law firm: They conflate the roles of owner, investor, and worker
since, contrary to typical corporations, the same individuals occupy all three roles. This is an
error, which the creation of our hypothetical derivative would expose and necessarily correct.
As workers, their economic value is essentially what the market would have to pay a similarly
skilled lawyer-employee. As investors (which many of course actually are as contributors of
capital), they’re due a competitive return on their funds, adjusted for the risk of the enterprise.
Finally, as owners, they would be entitled to the residual profit retained after all the factors of
production—including themselves as producing lawyers—receives fair market remuneration.
You’re right to point to Stephen Mayson, Building Sustainable Value: A Capital Idea, in
Managing the Modern Law Firm: New Challenges, New Perspectives 141 (Laura Empson ed.
2007), where he says (at 145) that a rational investor would value a firm primarily based on
“the volume of economic income and its perceived sustainability.” Ceteris paribus, more
income is more valuable, but not at the expense of behaviors (such as hoarding clients,
resisting entreaties to collaborate, refusing to contribute to unbillable “firm building” activities
such as mentoring) which create an unstable firm. I will suggest a bit further along that this is
potentially one of the salient results of the derivative thought experiment.

Agency Costs
As always in discussions of organizational structure, it’s essential to address the
challenge of how to keep an agent faithful to their principals.
I may be a poor one to consult on how to best design an organization’s incentives to
minimize the risk of agents straying, because I’ve always believed the most potent and vital
constraint is one’s internal ethical compass—the sense of professional integrity, responsibility,
and duty that makes the thought of elevating self-interest over one’s client unthinkable. The
most rigorous compliance or organizational governance procedures imaginable won’t stop
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anyone with larceny in their heart, and a sense of personal honor is always a more sturdy
guide to conduct than a disclosure checklist.
But I also believe, as you seem to, that a consistent course of lawyers’ placing their selfinterest above their clients is economically self-defeating in a competitive marketplace. In the
short run, there can be deviations from this—and justice delayed is irksome—but I firmly
believe it catches up with everyone in the longer run.
Particularly to the extent having outside investors might increase a firm’s
“transparency,” there may be at least some reason for optimism that lawyers would be less, not
more, inclined to deviate from the highest professional standards for fear of being exposed.
Here’s where I come out: The important question for present purposes is not whether
there are lurking agency costs under the present system or the hypothetical system, but
whether there’s a persuasive case to be made that there would be a material, detrimental
increase in those costs if we moved to the new model. I can’t see any reason why that would
be.

Law as Public Good
You introduce a fascinating perspective on this issue by pointing out that one of the
“products” of lawyers’ practicing is law itself, noting that litigation establishes precedents which
govern other parties’ future conduct; that regulatory practice establishes the parameters of
legitimate activity; and that transactional work—to my mind the most fertile of all—produces
“novel legal forms that can become part of the accepted repertoire of private arrangements that
the law will honor.”
I endorse your observations wholeheartedly, and would add only this:
•

I believe the primary reason the Anglo-Saxon common law tradition has become the de
facto international law of business is its malleability and extensibility: Private
practitioners can dream up new legal forms which, if upheld, can be relied upon as
guides to future conduct. Civil-code regimes simply do not contemplate or permit this
flexibility. 1

•

Having read “Tombstones: A Lawyer’s Tales from the Takeover Decade” (Farrar Straus:
1992), by Larry Lederman, a Cravath-trained lawyer who become a partner at Wachtell,
and whom I’ve interviewed, I can report that many of the innovative tactics we take for
granted today, such as poison pills, LBO’s, proxy fights, and “Revlon” auctions, were
made up on the fly by practitioners in the trenches, seeking tactical advantage in the
thick of a contested deal, who had no assurance courts would uphold them.

And you’re right to point out our increasing appreciation of the profound contribution
that everyday citizens’ understanding of the rule of law makes to constraining self-interest and
ordering behavior in ways policing or surveillance never could.

1

See http://www.bmacewen.com/blog/archives/2006/10/98_of_the_global_100_are.html
23

That said, I have to question why or how introducing our proposed derivatives would
diminish lawyers’ incentives, ability, or desire to continue to contribute to the corpus of public
law. Actually, I would argue the contrary: That the “output” of public law might be expected
to increase, not decrease, in our proposed derivatives-enabled model.
Why? More than is the case today, I believe firms would be rewarded for creating
innovative legal forms and tactics. To support this, I look to the experience of securities
broker-dealers and investment banks following the deregulatory “Big Bang.” In the case of that
industry, two unexpected developments rapidly became apparent: First, that this hitherto
sleepy sector could begin to display shocking dynamism in rolling out new products and services
for their clients. And second, that access to capital opened a new landscape in the form of
being able to aggressively pursue mergers, acquisitions, spin-offs, and recombination’s that
altered the industry to an unrecognizable degree.
The second is interesting, but the first is important.
While it’s certainly the case that no one can patent or copyright a new financial
instrument or a new legal form or tactic, it’s indisputably the case that there’s a “first mover
advantage” phenomenon in play, such that Wachtell became the go-to firm for corporations in
the market for poison pills, and remains so to a remarkable extent a quarter of a century later.
In sum, I can’t be certain, but I would wager the quality and quantity of “public law”
output would benefit, not suffer, from our proposed regime.

Investor Preference for Stability
One of the most significant unintended consequences—not foreseen by me in my
original thinking on this—might be the gravitational pull the introduction of derivatives should
exert towards putting a premium on firm stability over short-term profitability.
Consider: Under the current model partners have every incentive to “strip-mine the firm,” as
one of my friends puts it, at the end of every fiscal year. Law firms notoriously under-invest in:
• information technology,
• knowledge management systems,
• long-run commitments to professional development, retention, and training, and
• a host of other intangible firm assets which have real costs today but only
unquantifiable benefits in the future.
As I’ve written, the thought process of many senior partners is that associate mentoring is fine,
“but I really like my summer in the south of France and a new Mercedes every other year.”
Moreover, you and a host other commentators, including Stephen Mayson, have
commented on the fact that law firms are “people businesses.” This makes them inherently
fragile, as the shockingly rapid decline and implosion of some name-brand firms (Brobeck,
Coudert Bros.) has amply demonstrated. 2
2

I won’t try to list all the firms that were rescued from eventual collapse or dissolution by
“friendly” mergers, but their numbers are legion.
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The devil here is obviously the temptation for partners with portable books of business
to decamp to another firm willing to pay them close to the capitalized value of their future
revenue stream—which destabilizes the “losing” firm and does not in fact economically benefit
the “winning” firm, as the value of their business is captured by the individual lawyer, not the
firm. 3
Another potential benefit of linking the overall financial remuneration of partners more
tightly to the success of the firm in toto, in contrast to their individual portfolio of business, is
the incentive it will provide hitherto-autonomous lawyers to hew more closely to firm
governance standards and expectations.
In the recent collapse of Jenkins & Gilchrist, we essentially saw a large, prestigious, and
successful firm brought down by the actions of a single rogue partner, Paul Daugerdas, and his
hyper-aggressive tax-shelter practice. You rightly point out, Mitt, that we now know enough
about the behavior of individuals in organizations to be able to predict with confidence that the
ethical tone of a firm will have a potent influence on individuals’ behavior.
If one result of introducing a derivative reflecting overall firm valuation into the overall
compensation calculus would be to reinforce a firm-wide ethical and professional orientation, it’s
incomprehensible to me how, precisely, permitting non-lawyers to own an interest in that
derivative would compromise firms’ professional ethos.

The Value of the Derivative vs. PEP As The Marquee Number
You introduce a fascinating discussion of whether the value of the derivative (call it $D)
would supersede PEP as the number of all numbers which people use as short-hand for the
successfulness, importance, or value of a firm. We all know the evils, intrinsic and unintended,
of PEP as the marquee metric for law firms. So of course, one snappy—if not cynical—response
to the question is to ask if PEP is so bad, how could $D be worse?
But of course you’re raising a more important and subtle question, specifically whether a
more or less explicit valuation for a law firm wouldn’t cross “a qualitatively important divide,”
making law firms equivalent in the public’s eyes to “the ranks of businessmen and women, and
[making] law regarded as even more explicitly a commodity for sale.”

3

The economic literature which discusses this syndrome is colloquially known as “superstar
economics,” and primarily addresses entertainment celebrities and marquee athletes, where
financial information is readily obtainable about signing bonuses, guarantees, revenue shares,
and so forth. Obviously no comparable public data is available in law firm land, but the
consistent finding of the literature in other industries is that the “superstar” tends to capture
essentially all the incremental profit which would otherwise go to the signing franchise.
If one believes that labor markets—at least at such elevated levels—are reasonably transparent
and competitive, this is to be expected. Since the market for laterals in law firms is not so
transparent, I subscribe to the theory that some law firms have a “comparative advantage” in
recruiting from, and profiting from, laterals, and thus that there are consistent winners and
losers in the lateral recruitment tournament.
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Since this is a thought experiment—and since the double-blind real world experiment
can never be performed—all we can really do at this point is speculate, but I’m more sanguine
than you. I don’t believe this is a material risk. Why not?
•

First of all, much turns on the audience who might entertain the “commodity for sale”
view. Let’s face facts: Very very few Americans actually are clients of AmLaw 100 or
200 firms, which is the universe (I think) that we’re interested in. For the vast majority
of our fellow citizens, therefore, this would be a non-event. In fact, I would wager that
if you took a poll today asking people whether law firms could be public companies, the
majority would assume they could be.

•

For our target audience—clients of AmLaw firms and lawyers who work for them or
might aspire to working for them—the characterization of what they do as a “commodity
for sale” is simultaneously one of their worst nightmares and utterly alien to their
perception of their own professional ethos.

•

Realistically, I think the “shock” of law firms’ being able to engage public investors
would be short-lived, and the cynicism, if any, transitory and soon forgotten. I haven’t
heard Goldman Sachs accused of offering commodity service lately, or of being
particularly self-serving or prone to conflicts of interest. (Obviously, any firm can fall
into those traps, but we already have perfectly satisfactory rules on the books punishing
self-dealing and conflicts; we know how to deal with those infractions.)

•

Lastly, you mention that you “generally side with those who regard the professionbusiness dichotomy as spectacularly unhelpful,” which I roundly applaud, but I might
take it a step further than you in its implications. 4

To me, the profession/business dichotomy is worse than false: I believe that it’s only
the well-run, stable, cash-generating businesses that can provide the robust infrastructure—and
interesting client base—that professionals need to achieve at the highest levels. Wachtell is
famously successful in terms of financial performance, but what’s less well known is that their
ratio of support staff to lawyers is 2:1 as against an industry average of 1:1—or twice as high.
I would argue their unparalleled financial success is what enables them to provide unmatched
levels of support for their professionals.
4

GE under Jack Welch was by all accounts a particularly well-run business, but I think he
displayed an astute ear for “professionalism” by making use of the “forced ranking” annual
evaluation, where the bottom 10% of performers were counseled and coached but ultimately
let go if they could not measure up. Sounds ruthless, but he made it clear that he saw it as
essentially humane: The justification was to reward excellence, to enable the high-performers
to operate in an environment with minimal “drag,” and perhaps most important of all, to give
the bottom-10% misfits an opportunity to find a happier and more productive role to fill, since
they were clearly not succeeding where they were—and being resigned to permitting them to
stay was doing them no favor in the long run.
The analogy to law firms as businesses is far from exact, but I believe there’s wisdom in
the observation that mopey, under-utilized, under-performing colleagues drain professional
esprit de corps.
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Larry Ribstein’s (Brief) Comments
In his April 1 email, Larry raises two interesting points: First, that we generally leave
organizational and capital structure to “the market for state law,” and second that we might be
better off not “minimally interfering with existing rules” but simply by “scrapping the rules and
letting the market equilibrate.”
I endorse #2 enthusiastically; would that I believed it possible. If anyone wants to
mount a serious challenge to the ABA’s medieval guild mentality, show me where to sign up.
That our industry is the only one which attempts—with a transparent lack of success—to cloak
anticompetitive injunctions with the cloth of “ethics” is as humiliating as it is depressing.
As for #1, my view follows from #2: We do not in fact have any genuine “market for
state law” today. What we have is a monopolistic private cartel, the ABA, imposing its
protectionist views on an extremely significant industry—one accounting for nearly 2% of US
GDP. This is a classic case of “regulatory capture,” in my view, where deference to the
regulatory entities’ judgment is to be eschewed, not endorsed.
In any event, those are my thoughts. My question for you (both) is: Where do we go
with this from here?
Best regards,

Bruce MacEwen
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University of Illinois College of Law
504 East Pennsylvania Avenue
Champaign, Illinois 61820
April 11, 2007

Dear Bruce and Mitt:
Thanks very much for your thought-provoking letters. What began with Bruce's fairly
radical suggestion of law firm derivatives is evolving, at least in my mind, into something
broader. You may or may not want to go along for the ride, but let me at any rate try to lay
out a map.
We started with Bruce's question: "Could law firms, consonant with ethical rules, create
a derivative financial instrument engineered to reflect the implicit value of the firm as if it were
tradable as a stock?" Bruce's stated objective was to address the problem that large firm
partners have "no material wealth-creation opportunities" comparable to executive stock plans.
This leaves the firms vulnerable to raiding by other types of firms, adverse (ordinary income)
tax treatment, and possible international competition growing out of the Clementi reforms.
Mitt's response puts Bruce's suggestion into the broader framework of the incentive
problems facing modern lawyers and law firms. Mitt wonders about the effect of Bruce's
instrument, specifically on control by non-lawyers and possibility of working to the share price,
on lawyers' responsibility to their clients and their public role in the creation of law, and on the
potential commodification of law practice.
Bruce in response elaborates on the nature and purposes of the instrument. He notes
some advantages: making more transparent lawyers' separate roles as owners, investors and
workers; allowing firms to build infrastructure and capitalize on legal innovation; and giving
lawyers an interest in building the firm rather than their own books of business. More to the
point, Bruce wonders if stock price might be a better metric than PEP – or at least how it could
be worse than the "eat what you kill" (EWYK) philosophy we observe today.
Mitt
acknowledges some of those advantages as well.
Mitt's and Bruce's follow-ups to Bruce's original proposal obviously move from merely
providing better compensation for big firm lawyers to addressing the fundamental structural
and incentive problems with big law firms. It seems to me that the basic problem is that the
proposal, as striking as it is, is actually too modest for the problems it addresses. The
limitation, of course, is that the proposal is designed to arbitrage around existing rules, and as
Mitt points out, and Bruce acknowledges, there are limits to feasible arbitrage.
One possible answer is to think outside the box, or more precisely the rules, particularly
since that would seem to be where the follow-ups are leading us. Bruce would endorse this,
"would that I believed it possible." For reasons discussed below, I think it is possible. More
importantly, it's very difficult to think about the broader issues raised by Bruce's proposal unless
we put the underlying ethical restrictions on the table.
We agree that it's necessary to encourage lawyers to work for the long-run interests of
clients and society rather than the short-run interests produced by PEP and EWYK. Lawyers
have a powerful incentive to do whatever it takes to please the "client," which actually means
those who are running the client. In my view (see Limited Liability of Professional Firms after
Enron, 29 Journal of Corporation Law 427 (2004) and Ethical Rules, Agency Costs and Law Firm
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Structure, 84 Virginia Law Review 1707 (1998)), law firms theoretically can mitigate that
incentive. Specifically, clients (by which I mean their residual claimants) hire law firms as a
form of "reputational bond." The law firm then, at least theoretically, establishes internal
structures that help ensure that the lawyers serve the clients' long-run interests in the
enforcement of the "bond."
It is important to keep in mind that, in order to protect its reputation, the firm has to be
able to give its members property rights in the success of the firm as a whole rather than
merely in their own client billings. Only such incentives can encourage the members to align
with the firm's interest in its reputation, rather than with the potentially short-run interests of
the client’s managers who decide whether to hire or fire the lawyer. A big part of the equation,
therefore, is how firms compensate their lawyers. Traditional profit shares could provide the
right firm-based rather than client-based compensation – for example, by paying partners
strictly by seniority rather. A derivative might enhance the effect by using a market for the
profit interest to increase the accuracy of the valuation. It might also provide some tax
advantages (though I'm not confident of the alchemy that turns profits into capital gains, and
this is being questioned right now in Congress in the context of private equity compensation).
Does the absence of such a derivative really explain why we don't observe much firmbased compensation? I wonder. I've argued in my prior articles that lawyers' incentives
depend not only on how the firm compensates the lawyer, but on the firm's ability to keep
these compensation deals from unraveling. Ethical restrictions on non-competition agreements,
however, are based on the idea that clients have to be able to choose and control individual
lawyers rather than be “owned” in some sense by the firm. It's hard to bind lawyers to the firm
as a whole when a client is dangling a better deal, particularly when the lawyers know that their
partners will be tempted by the same deals. It's this problem that really inhibits firms from
developing the sort of intellectual property that Bruce emphasizes. These inventions can't be
patented or copyrighted – the firm essentially has to rely on its contracts with its members. If
the contracts aren't enforceable, the firm has less incentive to develop the products.
Even apart from this problem, the usefulness of Bruce's derivative is sharply limited by
the restriction on non-lawyer owners. I accept for the sake of argument that an instrument
could be sold that gives the investors no role in control of the firm. You wouldn't necessarily
even need a "derivative" to accomplish that.
As I've written, (Going Privlic,
www.american.com/archive/2007/march-0307/going-privlic) this is essentially the structure of
the recent Blackstone IPO. But Mitt points out that this might not mollify the ethics cops.
Moreover, the need to block control obviously would constrain flexibility and marketability.
To make this work, I hypothesize that we need to confront the ethical restriction on
non-lawyer ownership. To begin with, we need to ask why we have the restriction in the first
place. Perhaps it once made sense when law firms really were partnerships in the classic sense
of a community of equal owners. This organizational form arguably helps overcome information
asymmetry between lawyer and client. See Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis, A Theory of
Partnerships, http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id= 311159. Clients can't easily
measure lawyer quality, so they rely on the firm to carefully choose its partners. As long as
lawyers practice in a partnership in which they share profits equally with their co-partners, they
have an incentive to hire only the highest quality professionals, and to monitor and mentor
them in order to maintain quality. If they can hire workers at their market wage, they'll have
the incentive to hire cheap workers and try to make a profit out of them by overcharging
clients. Ethical restrictions on capital formation reflect this model of co-equal partners. But the
model starts breaking down as soon as firms go to something other than equal sharing,
particularly when they leverage their structures with many non-partner employees. Restricting
partners to skilled professionals mitigates the difficulty of monitoring them, but it does not solve
the basic incentive problem that arises from deviations from equal sharing.
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Now let's consider some potential advantages of allowing lawyers to practice law in

publicly-owned firms, free from the ethical constraints on both ownership and non-competes.

Such a firm would want to maximize overall profits, and not just profits produced by lawyers in
the practice of law. It would also be able to enter into contracts among the members that
promote this goal. This structure can produce value in a number of ways. First, the firm could
leverage its reputation by applying it to services that are synergistically related to law practice.
Second, the firm could, and would have the incentive, to offer more valuable one-stop shopping
to clients. This not only reduces client transaction costs, but reduces lawyer-client agency costs
by encouraging the firm's employees to recommend the services clients need – not just legal
services, but accounting, financial and other services as well. Third, a large multi-service
publicly traded brand would offer clients more security. With the increasing risk of large-scale
liability, and firms' fragility in the face of partner defections, clients don't get the protection they
once could expect from mere size and fancy offices. In short, a firm that fully exploited the
value and synergies inherent in its brand would be a more valuable firm than the law-only firms
of today. And such a firm could offer its lawyer-employees the sort of firm-based incentives
that can constrain the destructive tendencies of EWYK.

What about the problem of practicing to the share price? I've laid out my version of
why that's not a problem in conventional corporations in Accountability and Responsibility in
Corporate Governance, 81 Notre Dame Law Review 1431 (2006). My basic point there is that
there is a lot of empirical and theoretical support for the notion that the current model of
corporate managers being held basically responsive to market forces produces social
responsibility, and that disrupting that model, as some social responsibility theorists propose, is
likely actually to reduce social welfare. That point is also made more concisely in Gordon
Dystopian
Potential
of
Corporate
Law,
Smith's
fine
recent
article,
The
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=976742. As you both have wondered, can
these incentives really be worse than those produced by PEP and EWYK?
To be sure, lawyer-employees of large firms may go astray, and may not be attentive
enough to their important role in creating and maintaining legal institutions. I agree that that
role is important. See Class Action Lawyers as Lawmakers (with Kobayashi), 46 Arizona L. Rev.
733 (2004) and Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69 Mo. L. Rev. 299
(2004). Indeed, I've argued that lawyers' public law-creation role is not just one, but the only,
justification for continuing lawyer licensing. Whether or not that's true, lawyer discipline would
survive law firm restructuring. The question is whether the regulation ought to focus on lawyer
behavior or law firm structure. There is little mandatory regulation of corporate structure, yet
corporate behavior itself is heavily regulated by federal and state law. I suggest that this may
be the appropriate approach to law firms as well. I recognize that many will argue that internal
firm incentives may push against the incentives provided by ethical rules. But, as I argue
above, I think that the incentives produced by publicly held firms would actually complement,
rather than be inconsistent with, regulation.
If you're ready to contemplate the possibility of deregulating law firm structure, then we
reach the question of how to achieve this result. I previously alluded to state competition. Of
course, as Bruce noted, we don't have any such thing now. One reason is that ethical rules are
imposed on a territorial basis, which means that multi-jurisdictional firms may be subject to the
law of each state in which they have a branch office. In Ethical Rules, Law Firm Structure and
Choice of Law, 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1161 (2001), I suggest adopting a corporate-type choice-oflaw rule that would permit firms to choose a single regime to provide "structural" ethical rules,
like those dealing with law firm ownership and non-competition agreements But I understand
that without this change the idea of competition for these rules doesn't work.
The basic problem with all this is that it flies in the face of the guild mentality that still
has an iron grip on the legal profession. The fundamental question concerns what might be
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called "lawyer exceptionalism" – are lawyers and law firms really different from the rest of
society and our capitalist economy? If, as I argue above, working to the share price basically
works for society in corporations generally, we have to ask why it shouldn't work for lawyers.
It's right to think about the potential commodification of law practice. Commodification is what
capitalism does. The question is whether that's something to worry about, or to welcome.
Even if I'm right, could this happen? I think so. If there's money in the high-value
publicly held law firm, there's also money in challenging and possibly breaking down the
restrictions. Moreover, legal business is now international, and can be captured by Clementiized UK firms. Capitalism is profoundly destructive. Whether we like it or not, international
competition could break down the resistance of tradition and history.
I want to emphasize that one doesn't have to agree with all, or even any, of the above
to accept my basic point that these issues should be on the table. Perhaps a debate on this
subject will come to the conclusion that these ideas are profoundly wrong and unrealistic. But
even if that's so, I think the debate will have been useful. Such a debate should include not
only lawyers and scholars of the legal profession, but also some corporate and finance people,
even those (like Gordon Smith mentioned above) who have never even considered the
application of their work to law firms, but whose work is illuminating on these issues.
So, in conclusion, I think that Bruce has raised some very interesting questions. I don't
see how we can avoid the broader implications of those questions, so we may as well embrace
them.
Sincerely,
Larry
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Adam Smith, Esq.
305 West 98th Street
(#4C-S)
New York, NY 10025
April 15, 2007
Prof. Milton Regan
Georgetown University Law Center
Prof. Larry Ribstein
University of Illinois College of Law
Re: Law Firms & Capital Market Access
Dear Mitt & Larry:
First, just a personal word on how much I’m enjoying engaging with you both on this
intellectual pursuit. I’m pleased my initial question has led in unanticipated directions, but I
embrace them wholeheartedly.
Just a few “final” (for this round, at least) thoughts in response to Larry’s last letter
suggesting that “we may as well embrace” “the broader implications.”
•

Permit me to stipulate that I endorse going beyond my initial proposal since it’s clearly
the case that it “is actually too modest for the problems it addresses.” I envisioned a
modest proposal for modest purposes, but I now do not believe the consequences of my
original proposal can be limited: In for a dime, in for a dollar. More seriously, I think
that questioning the “ethical” proscriptions against non-lawyer ownership of law firms
opens up the entire landscape of law firm structure, lawyer incentives, and lawyer
behavior.

•

Once one’s eyes are opened, as it were, to how bizarrely “exceptional” law firm
structure and regulation are, the door is wide open to what Larry nicely characterizes as
capitalism’s “profoundly destructive” marketplace logic. All I would add is that
capitalism is profoundly destructive only to the status quo and that the flipside of that
“destruction” is the immensely more valuable innovation and creativity which
inadvertently cause that destruction. (The Wintel PC platform may have “destroyed”
DEC and Wang, and imperiled IBM for a decade or so, but would we take the other side
of that trade?)

•

To question the ethical proscription on non-lawyer ownership requires understanding its
original justifications, and determining whether they are obsolete or still applicable with
any degree of force. I think this analytic exercise should be an agenda item of its own
for our proposed conference. (I know where I come out, but I suspect I’m in the
distinct minority in our profession: We need to air this linen very publicly.)
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•

•

Larry lays out three positive consequences of permitting non-lawyer ownership, creating
what I’ll all “hybrid” firms, providing legal and non-legal services, all of which I
thoroughly endorse and to which I would add a fourth:
o

First, that a hybrid firm could use its reputational capital to provide law-related
services. I heartily agree, and would point to the financial services industry as a
model. Institutions there have moved over the past century from plain old
lending to trading for clients and then their own accounts, to securitizing
portfolios of debt, to creating derivatives and beyond.

o

Second, that hybrid firms would have every incentive—nicely aligned with their
clients’ interests, I might add—to provide the appropriate mix of legal, financial,
accounting, tax, brokerage, and other services that best addresses the clients’
issues and challenges. Today, law firms have every incentive to overrecommend, over-sell, and over-perform legal services and legal services alone.

o

Third, that a firm performing an array of services would offer more stability. This
is surely the case, as we know from diversified portfolio theory if nothing else.
Law firms today are inherently fragile, subject to “runs on the bank” in the form
of partner defections. To be sure, the intellectual capital of the Brobeck’s and
Coudert’s of the world is not destroyed: It migrates to Clifford Chance,
O’Melveny, Orrick, etc., but with tremendous transactions costs to clients and the
system in general and at great personal cost to the individuals required to
relocate, especially those with weak or nonexistent practices of their own.

o

Finally, let me add that I think hybrid firms would find themselves, through
desire or market necessity, pursuing innovation in the delivery of legal services,
the likes of which we can only imagine. Elsewhere I’ve speculated on whether
the legal industry couldn’t truly take as its model financial services, which is a
strikingly rich ecosystem of players of every size from one-man bands to some of
the largest corporations in the world, providing a tremendous variety of products
and services—in constantly growing numbers and broadening diversity.

Larry concludes with two ideas which I think are almost one and the same: The
question of “whether the regulation ought to focus on lawyer behavior or law firm
structure.” This is one of those questions that, once you pose it, answers itself.
Answer A is clearly correct, and the fact that we’ve tolerated Answer B as long as we
have speaks loudly to how blinkered our professional outlook can be.
But I think getting to that result is deeply linked to his other concluding point, asking
why law firms should not be able to choose their governing structural law ex ante rather
than having it foisted upon them by the happenstance of geography—as corporations
can do. I would like to believe that single change—permitting law firms to elect their
“home” jurisdiction for purposes of fundamental structure law—would in itself cause the
almost inevitable cascade of everything else we’ve been discussing, through the “choice
of law competition” Larry has studied and written about so effectively.
And doesn’t this simply reflect the world we live in today? What makes Clifford Chance
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a UK and therefore Clementi-eligible firm, or Orrick a “California” firm when its largest
single office is in New York?
As I said at the outset, this began as a remarkable intellectual journey for me and has
only become deeper and wider in its implications. Thank you both for pursuing this in the
spirit of finding out where it might lead, and “embracing” that.
Best regards,

Bruce MacEwen
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